My post, The Way of Phenomenology
, got accepted to the latest Philosophers' Carnival
, hosted by Kenny Pearce
. In his introduction to my piece, Kenny says:
While I am generally sympathetic to the idea of arguing first and foremost from phenomena/experience (see my own contribution below), I must say that I can't see how Kevin can claim that "logic is not ontologically fundamental" and then talk about "presenting a coherent case." I would like to hear why he wants to, and how he can, present a coherent case (by which I assume he means a logical argument) if experience is more fundamental than logic. Of course, such is the nature of continental philosophy, and those of us more in the analytic tradition have always had difficulty comprehending it (when we have bothered to take the effort, which hasn't been often enough).
I'm currently working through this and will post on it in the not too distant future. The basic point, though, is that a phenomenological explication is different than a logical explication--the latter seeks to order that which has already appeared while the former is concerned with the appearing itself. Someone might think that this is a distinction without a difference--if there is an appearing it will, of necessity, follow a logical form. This, however, is what Heidegger is arguing against (well, one of the things he is arguing against). More on this later. Till then, enjoy the other posts that got accepted to the Carnival.